Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety (2012) / Chapter Skim
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4 Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
4 Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
Pages 75-89
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From page 75... ...
. The rig served as a self-propelled vessel, a stable floating base for drilling and outfitting a deep subsea well, a command and control base for exploration, and a home for its crew.2 As is typical for offshore drilling rigs, when it was under way at sea, the rig was operated by a crew under the command leadership of a U.S.
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From page 76... ...
Generated electrical power was also consumed by hotel loads, drilling equipment loads, and damage control equipment including pumps for firefighting and dewatering. A backup diesel generator, smaller than any of the six main units, provided emergency power for lighting and restarting the main engines in the event of a loss of main power.
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From page 77... ...
Thirteen of the 27 CGDs had automatic responses, such as securing ventilation fans and all electrical power to an affected area that was in an alarm condition, while the other 14 only had an audible and visual display. The engine room ventilation CGDs did not have an automated response, which required a crew member to validate an alarm in this space before taking manual actions, since securing one or more operating diesel engines could disrupt dynamic positioning of the rig (Transocean 2011a)
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From page 78... ...
Loss of power from the two operating diesel generators occurred close to the time of the explosions. Testimony from some of the survivors indicated that the operating diesel generators increased speed in the seconds preceding the explosions and then stopped at the second explosion.3 Other testimony described a loss of lighting and general electrical power just before the second explosion.4 It was consistently reported that lighting and other power had failed prior to the diesel generator engines shutting down.5 No independent data were available to support or refute the witness testimony concerning the sequence of electric plant changes during the disaster.
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From page 79... ...
9 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, July 19, 2010, Hearing before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, 35-36. 10 Testimony of Micah Sandell, May 29, 2010, Hearing Before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, 9-11.
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From page 80... ...
14 Testimony of Stephen Bertone, July 19, 2010, Hearing Before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, 39-40. 15 Testimony of Micah Sandell, May 29, 2010, Hearing Before the Deepwater Horizon Joint Investigation Team, 11-13.
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From page 81... ...
All of those areas were broadly exposed to the gaseous hydrocarbon flow erupting from the well through the MGS system vents.18 No protection system was built into these working areas of the rig to deflect the effects of explosion from those who were exposed. Complex Operations in Hazardous Environments Conduct of marine exploration drilling from the Deepwater Horizon and other deepwater rigs is an extremely complex engineering operation in an unforgiving maritime environment.
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From page 82... ...
Extensive safety training is based on past accidents. The safety program structure is enhanced by the clarity, uniformity, and consistency of submarine safety requirements and responsibilities.
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From page 83... ...
Finding 4.2d: Poor performance by the standby diesel generator may indicate that insufficient environmental testing was specified for this critical, last-resort power system to demonstrate robust ca pability or any local indication of generator starting availability. Alarm and Indication Systems, Procedures, and Training Finding 4.3: Alarm and indication systems, procedures, and training were insufficient to ensure timely and effective actions to prevent the explosions or respond to save the rig.
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From page 84... ...
Coast Guard's requirement for the number and placement of lifeboats was shown to be prudent and resulted in suffi cient lifeboat capacity for effective rig abandonment. The Coast Guard's investigation report (USCG 2011)
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From page 85... ...
. If the warning is inhibited or not addressed in an appropriate time interval, autonomous operation of the blind shear rams, EDS, general alarm, and other safety systems on the rig should occur.21 20 As a classification society, the role of ABS is to verify that marine vessels and offshore structures comply with rules that the society has established for design, construction, and periodic survey (ABS 2011)
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From page 86... ...
military, to address the complex and integrated "system of systems" challenges faced in safely operating deepwater drilling rigs. The method should take into consideration the coupled effects of well design and rig de sign.
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From page 87... ...
Education and Training of Rig Personnel Recommendation 4.12: Drilling rig contractors should require realistic and effective training in operations and emergency situations for key personnel before assignment to any rig. Industry should also require that personnel aboard the rig achieve and maintain a high degree of expertise in their assigned watch station, including formal qualifica tion and periodic reexamination.
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From page 88... ...
. For example, a typical master of unrestricted tonnage has a 4-year degree in a recognized maritime academy deck officer curriculum or more than 3 years of relevant rating sea time, plus additional years of sea experience in successive promotion roles from third mate through second mate and chief mate.
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From page 89... ...
System Safety Certification Recommendation 4.20: Industry and regulators should consider rele vant aspects of programs for system safety certification that were es tablished for other safety-critical large-scale activities, such as the U.S. Navy's Submarine Safety Program, as guidance in developing a response to the Deepwater Horizon incident.
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